Haddrick Byrd v. Robert Shannon by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-25-2013 
Haddrick Byrd v. Robert Shannon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Haddrick Byrd v. Robert Shannon" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 892. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/892 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












ROBERT SHANNON, Superintendent SCI-Frackville; 
V. STANISHEFSKI, Corrections Health 
Care Administrator SCI-Frackville; 
JACK ROBINSON, Supervising Nurse SCI-Frackville; 
H. SPENCER, Nurse SCI-Frackville; 
DORINA VARNER, 
Chief Grievance Officer, Camp Hill, PA 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-09-cv-01551) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
______ 
 
Argued October 3, 2012 
 
Opinion Issued March 11, 2013 
 2 
Panel Rehearing Granted April 2, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 




1111 Altamont Boulevard 
Frackville, PA  17931 
 Pro Se Appellant 
 
Richard H. Frankel 
Drexel University 
Earle Mack School of Law 
3320 Market Street 
Philadelphia, PA  19104 
 
Alexandra Scanlon (ARGUED) 
Drexel University 
Earle Mack School of Law 
L324 
3320 Market Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
 
Rebecca Trela (ARGUED) 
Drexel University 
Earle Mack School of Law 
L324 
3320 Market Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
 3 
 Amicus Appellant / Court 
 Appointed Amicus Curiae 
 
Raymond W. Dorian (ARGUED) 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
Office of Chief Counsel 
1920 Technology Parkway 
Mechanicsburg, PA  17050 
 Counsel for Appellees 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Haddrick Byrd, a prisoner at SCI-Frackville, filed a 
pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania alleging that various Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) employees violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights and were negligent under state law.  
Byrd appeals the District Court‟s order granting summary 
judgment to DOC employees V. Stanishefski, Jack Robinson, 
and H. Spencer on his Eighth Amendment claims.  Byrd also 
appeals the District Court‟s decision to decline 
reconsideration of its order granting a motion to dismiss for 
DOC employees Robert Shannon and Dorina Varner.  In 
addition, Byrd appeals the District Court‟s decision to decline 
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law negligence 
claims. 
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Instead of paying a docketing fee on appeal, Byrd filed 
a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  We 
appointed counsel to act as amicus curiae and address the 
issue of whether Byrd was eligible to proceed IFP.  
Thereafter, we initially determined that Byrd was ineligible 
for IFP status.  However, after granting amicus‟s petition for 
panel rehearing, we have decided to grant Byrd‟s request to 
proceed IFP.  As such, we will reach the merits of Byrd‟s 
appeal, and we will affirm the District Court‟s order granting 
summary judgment, along with its decision to decline 
reconsideration of its previous order, and its decision to 
decline supplemental jurisdiction over Byrd‟s state law 
claims. 
I. 
At all times relevant to this appeal, Byrd was an 
inmate at SCI-Frackville.  Byrd‟s pro se complaint of August 
13, 2009 named the following defendants:  (1) Robert 
Shannon, the Superintendent of SCI-Frackville; (2) V. 
Stanishefski, the Corrections Health Care Administrator at 
SCI-Frackville; (3) Jack Robinson, the Supervising Nurse at 
SCI-Frackville; (4) H. Spencer, a Nurse at SCI-Frackville; 
and (5) Dorina Varner, the Chief Grievance Officer for the 
DOC.  Byrd specifically alleges that these DOC employees 
showed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs 
by failing to provide him with prescription eye drops for his 
glaucoma, thus depriving him of his Eighth Amendment 
rights and committing negligence under state law. 
The relevant events began in early 2008.  On January 
4, 2008, Byrd indicated to Spencer that he was experiencing 
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delays in receiving his prescription eye drops, Timolol and 
Travatan.  On February 7, 2008, Byrd informed Shannon that 
he was still experiencing delays in receiving his eye drops.  
Byrd‟s medical records indicate that he was given one 
month‟s supply of Timolol on both January 4, 2008 and 
February 8, 2008, and that he was given one month‟s supply 
of Travatan on both January 9, 2008 and February 6, 2008.  
After receiving one month‟s supply of Travatan on March 3, 
2008, Byrd wrote to Stanishefski about the delays.  On March 
6, 2008, Robinson responded on behalf of Stanishefski as 
follows:   
“We can not give you the eye drops if the 
pharmacy does not send them to us.  Also you 
were on the call out on 3/5/08 and did not show 
up for your drops.  You are now on the call out 
for 3/9/08.” 
Supp. App. at 33. 
Byrd was subsequently given one month‟s supply of 
both Timolol and Travatan on the following dates over the 
next five months:  April 3, May 1, May 29, June 25, and July 
24.  The prescription for Byrd‟s eye drops expired on July 31, 
2008.  Byrd did not notify Stanishefski regarding the 
expiration of his prescription until September 16, 2008.  The 
prescription was renewed on September 22, 2008, and Byrd 
was given one month‟s supply of Timolol and Travatan the 
next day.  However, Byrd experienced further delays.  On 
October 29, 2008, Byrd wrote to Stanishefski about not being 
called out to pick up his eye drops earlier that week.  
Robinson responded on behalf of Stanishefski as follows: 
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“Medical does not give you them.  We can only 
give them to you when the pharmacy ships 
them to us.  I will check what the problem is so 
to try and avoid this in the future.” 
Supp. App. at 33. 
Byrd, on November 3, 2008, filed a grievance 
regarding the delays.  The grievance named Shannon, 
Robinson, Stanishefski, and Varner, but did not name 
Spencer.  Robinson responded on behalf of Stanishefski as 
follows: 
“This a summary of my findings regarding your 
grievance #248753.  Your concern is you did 
not receive your eye drops for glaucoma.  A 
review of your medical record reveals your eye 
drop medication prescription expired on July 
31, 200[8].  You participate in the self-
medication program.  The self-medication 
permits you to be responsible for your health 
care needs.  You never attempted to access sick 
call when you knew the eye drops had expired.  
In addition you were also seen by the 
optometrist three times since July 2008 and 
never requested eye drops from him.  You have 
an eye condition that will require eye drop 
medication for the rest of your life.  I strongly 
encourage you to be an active participant in 
your care.  This grievance including monetary 
requests is denied.” 
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Supp. App. at 34. 
Byrd was subsequently given his eye drops on the 
following dates in 2008:  November 5 (Timolol), November 8 
(Travatan), December 2 (both), and December 31 (both).  
Byrd was seen by an optometrist on the following dates in 
2008:  March 19, April 16, July 9, October 1, October 29, 
November 19, and December 8. 
Byrd filed a complaint in the District Court on August 
13, 2009.  He was granted IFP status on September 9, 2009.  
The District Court, on February 22, 2010, granted defendants‟ 
motion to dismiss in part, dismissing Shannon and Varner due 
to their lack of involvement in Byrd‟s medical care.  On 
February 28, 2011, the District Court granted the remaining 
defendants‟ motion for summary judgment.  The District 
Court specifically held that Byrd failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies against Spencer and that Stanishefski 
and Robinson were not deliberately indifferent to Byrd‟s 
serious medical needs.  The District Court declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Byrd‟s remaining 
state law negligence claims.
1
 
 On April 5, 2011, Byrd filed a motion to proceed IFP 
on appeal.  That same day, the Clerk‟s Office notified Byrd 
that he had “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and had 
                                              
1
 The District Court adopted the report and 
recommendation of the Magistrate Judge in granting both the 
motion to dismiss (in part) and the motion for summary 
judgment. 
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to file a motion showing that he was in imminent danger of 
serious physical injury in order to be eligible for IFP status.  
Byrd‟s three potential strikes included two actions that were 
clearly dismissed for failure to state a claim:  (1) Byrd v. 
Parris, No. 99-cv-00769 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1999) and 
(2) Byrd v. City of Philadelphia, No. 06-cv-01957 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 10, 2006).  The other potential strike, Byrd v. Gillis, 
C.A. No. 01-3868 (3d Cir. July 30, 2002), was an appeal that 
was dismissed by this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
because it was “without merit.”  In response to the 
notification by the Clerk‟s Office, Byrd did not file a motion 
alleging imminent danger; instead, he submitted a response 
on April 19, 2011, arguing that the Clerk‟s Office made a 
mistake in determining that he had three strikes.  Byrd noted 
that, although he brought two prior actions that were 
dismissed for failure to state a claim, he did not proceed IFP 
in those actions. 
 In the January 12, 2012 order appointing amicus 
curiae, this Court instructed amicus to address whether 
dismissals of non-IFP actions and appeals can count as strikes 
under § 1915(g) or whether only IFP actions and appeals can 
count as strikes.  The Court also stated that “[a]micus counsel 
may wish to address the relevance, if any, of the fact that 28 
U.S.C. section 1915(e) and section 1915(g) use similar 
phrasing . . . that varies slightly from the language of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” 
 On February 28, 2012, amicus requested to expand the 
scope of its appointment.  Specifically, amicus sought leave 
to address whether this Court‟s dismissal of one of Byrd‟s 
previous cases, Byrd v. Gillis, C.A. No. 01-3868 (3d Cir. July 
 9 
30, 2002), constituted a strike.  On March 8, 2012, this Court 
granted in part and denied in part amicus‟s motion to expand 
the scope of its representation.  The Court permitted amicus 
to argue, with respect to Byrd v. Gillis, that “when an action is 
dismissed for a reason that is unclear, that dismissal does not 
count as a strike.” 
 On March 11, 2013, this panel denied Byrd‟s motion 
to proceed IFP, and thus, did not reach the merits of Byrd‟s 
appeal.  Amicus petitioned for panel rehearing on March 25, 
2013.  After granting the petition for panel rehearing on April 
2, 2013, we now reconsider our previous decision and reach 
the merits of Byrd‟s appeal. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this matter as an appeal of a 
final decision of the District Court.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
District Court did not address whether Byrd‟s eligibility for 
IFP status was foreclosed by the three strikes provision of 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(g).  We now address the § 1915(g) issue.  We 
will also reach the merits of Byrd‟s appeal. 
III. 
A. 
 In order to determine Byrd‟s IFP eligibility, we must 
decide whether “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) can be 
accrued in actions or appeals where the prisoner has prepaid 
the filing fee or whether “strikes” can only be accrued in IFP 
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actions or appeals.  Section 1915(g), enacted as a part of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), states: 
“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action 
or appeal a judgment in a civil action or 
proceeding under this section if the prisoner 
has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought 
an action or appeal in a court of the United 
States that was dismissed on the grounds that it 
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, unless the 
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 
physical injury.” 
 Three of our sister courts of appeals have held that 
strikes may be accrued in actions or appeals regardless of 
whether the prisoner has prepaid the filing fee or is 
proceeding IFP.  See Burghart v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 350 
Fed. App‟x 278, 279 (10th Cir. 2009); Hyland v. Clinton, 3 
Fed. App‟x 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2001); Duvall v. Miller, 122 
 11 
F.3d 489, 490 (7th Cir. 1997).  No court of appeals has held 
that strikes may only be accrued in IFP actions or appeals.
2
 
This situation presents an issue of statutory 
interpretation.  Our task is to give effect to the will of 
Congress, and where Congress‟s will has been expressed in 
language that has a reasonably plain meaning, that language 
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.  Negonsott v. 
Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993); see also Caraco Pharm. 
Labs., LTD v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (2012) 
(“We begin where all such inquiries must begin:  with the 
language of the statute itself.”).  If the language of the statute 
                                              
2
 This Court, in appointing amicus, expressed its 
understanding that there was a circuit split on this issue 
because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had 
implied that only IFP actions or appeals could be counted as 
strikes under § 1915(g).  See Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. 
Ctr. Med. Facility, 15 F.3d 775, 780-81 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(listing only dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a provision 
that only applies to IFP actions or appeals, as the types of 
dismissals that count as strikes).  Amicus, in a commendable 
act of candor, brought to our attention the fact that the Tenth 
Circuit, in subsequent cases, rejected the argument that 
§ 1915(g) strikes could only be accrued in IFP actions or 
appeals.  See Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 
1177 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that dismissals under 
§ 1915A, a provision that is not limited to IFP actions or 
appeals, can count as strikes); Burghart v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 
350 Fed. App‟x 278, 279 (10th Cir. 2009) (explicitly holding 
that non-IFP actions or appeals can count as strikes). 
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has a reasonably plain meaning, then our sole function is to 
enforce the statute‟s language.  United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
In determining whether the language of a particular 
statutory provision has a plain meaning, we consider the 
language in the context of the entire statute.  Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (stating that statutory 
interpretation focuses on “the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole”); see also Abdul-Akbar v. 
McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(interpreting one particular section of the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g), in the context of the PLRA as a whole).  The plain 
meaning of statutory language is not conclusive only when 
“the literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.”  Ron 
Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
Statutory purpose and legislative history may be 
referenced only if the statutory language is without a plain 
meaning, i.e., if the statutory language is ambiguous.  In re 
Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Statutory language is ambiguous only where it is “reasonably 
susceptible of different interpretations.”  Id. (quoting Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985)). 
Here, the statutory language has a reasonably plain 
meaning – “an action or appeal” is not limited to an IFP 
action or appeal; rather, it refers to both IFP and non-IFP 
actions or appeals.  The three strikes provision, § 1915(g), 
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does not make an explicit exception for previous actions or 
appeals where the prisoner was not granted IFP status.  See 
Burghart, 350 Fed. App‟x at 279 (“[Plaintiff] argues that 
Congress did not intend § 1915(g) to apply to prisoners who 
had not filed their earlier cases IFP.  However, § 1915(g) 
makes no distinction.”); Hyland, 3 Fed. App‟x at 479 
(“[Section] 1915(g) does not distinguish between prior in 
forma pauperis actions and prior actions in which the fee was 
paid.”); Duvall, 122 F.3d at 490 (“[Section 1915(g)] does not 
say, „brought an action or appeal in forma pauperis,‟ or 
„brought an action or appeal under this section.‟”). 
We acknowledge that this Court, in Santana v. United 
States, found the phrase “civil actions” in another part of the 
PLRA to “lack a plain meaning.”  98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 
1996) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and holding that the 
filing fee requirements of the PLRA with regard to “civil 
actions” did not apply to IFP habeas corpus petitions and 
appeals).  This Court‟s analysis in Santana, however, focused 
on the unique nature of habeas corpus actions.  Id. at 754.  In 
contrast to habeas corpus actions, standard non-IFP actions 
are not, “in effect, hybrid actions whose nature is not 
adequately captured by the phrase „civil action.‟”  Id.  Thus, 
Santana does not compel a conclusion that the phrase “an 
action or appeal” in § 1915(g) lacks a plain meaning. 
 The same can be said for Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hospital, wherein this Court stated that § 1915(e)(2), which 
uses language that closely tracks the three strikes provision of 
§ 1915(g), is limited to IFP actions or appeals.  293 F.3d 103, 
109 n.10 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Although the language of 
§ 1915(e)(2) does not expressly limit the provision‟s reach to 
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in forma pauperis claims, we believe Congress intended it to 
be so limited.”).  We do not find Grayson to be controlling.  
First, the finding in Grayson – that § 1915(e)(2) applies only 
to IFP actions or appeals – is dicta; it was not necessary to the 
Court‟s holding, which was that the district court was 
required to grant leave to amend before dismissing a pro se 
inmate‟s action for failure to state a claim.  Id. at 114.  
Second, the Grayson Court based its finding in part on the 
fact that any alternative interpretation of § 1915(e)(2) would 
render similar provisions of the PLRA superfluous.  Id. at 109 
n.10 (citing Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 
1999) (“[I]f all actions, whether pursued in forma pauperis or 
not, are to be screened by the district court pursuant to 
§ 1915(e)(2), the specific prisoner complaint screening 
provision, § 1915A, would be rendered largely 
superfluous.”)).  In contrast to § 1915(e)(2), if § 1915(g) were 
interpreted to encompass non-IFP actions and appeals, no 
other provision of the PLRA, including § 1915A, would be 
rendered superfluous. 
Finally, we acknowledge amicus‟s argument that the 
language difference between § 1915(g) and Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is instructive as to the 
meaning of “an action or appeal.”  Section 1915(g), just like 
the IFP specific provision, § 1915(e)(2), refers to an action 
that “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” 
while Rule 12(b)(6) refers to an action that “fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.”  Amicus argues that 
this contrast between “may” and “can” indicates that 
Congress used “may” in § 1915(g) as a signal to reference 
§ 1915(e) dismissals, which occur only in IFP actions and 
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appeals, as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, which occur 
in both IFP and non-IFP actions.  Although this argument is 
of some persuasive effect, it does not render the phrase “an 
action or appeal” to be without a plain meaning.  The bottom 
line remains that Congress could have easily differentiated 
between IFP and non-IFP actions or appeals in the language 
of § 1915(g), but it did not.  If Congress had intended to make 
an exception for non-IFP cases in § 1915(g), then it more 
likely would have explicitly done so, rather than merely using 
the word “may” instead of “can.” 
Thus, strikes may be accrued in actions or appeals 
regardless of whether the prisoner has prepaid the filing fee or 
is proceeding IFP, and Byrd‟s previous non-IFP actions, 
which were dismissed for failure to state a claim, count as 
strikes for purposes of § 1915(g). 
B. 
 Amicus argues that, even if Byrd‟s non-IFP actions 
count as strikes, Byrd still has only two strikes, rather than 
three, because this Court‟s dismissal of Byrd‟s appeal in Byrd 
v. Gillis, C.A. No. 01-3868 (3d Cir. July 30, 2002) under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) does not constitute a strike.  We agree. 
 In Byrd v. Gillis, Byrd brought suit in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania against prison officials in their 
individual and official capacities for failing to investigate a 
false misconduct report against him.  No. 01-cv-0576, slip op. 
at 1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2001).  As a result of the misconduct 
report, Byrd was placed in the restrictive housing unit for 60 
days.  Id. at 5.  Byrd alleged that he was “subjected to the 
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denial of due process, equal protection under the law, denial 
of religious practices, retaliation, malfeasance, non-feasance, 
and misfeasance.”  Id. at 1.  The Magistrate Judge3 granted 
the defendants‟ motion for summary judgment and concluded 
that, except for Byrd‟s due process claim regarding his 
misconduct hearing, Byrd failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.  Id. at 6-12.  In regard to Byrd‟s due process claim, 
the Magistrate Judge held that Byrd‟s placement in the 
restrictive housing unit did not implicate a protected liberty 
interest under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 
(1995).  Id. at 14-16.  Additionally, in regard to Byrd‟s 
official capacity claims, the Magistrate Judge concluded that 
the prison officials were immune from suit.  Id. at 13-14.  
Byrd‟s state law claims were held to be barred under the 
Eleventh Amendment.  Id. 
 On appeal, this Court held that the Magistrate Judge 
properly granted summary judgment.  Byrd v. Gillis, C.A. No. 
01-3868, slip op. at 4 (3d Cir. July 3, 2002).  The Court 
explicitly agreed that Byrd failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, that the alleged conduct did not 
implicate a protected liberty interest, and that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred Byrd‟s state law claims.  Id. at 3-4.  The 
Court ultimately dismissed the appeal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
because it was “without merit.”  Id. at 4. 
 Our Court has not yet stated a preferred approach for 
deciding when and whether “unclear” dismissals can be 
                                              
3
 The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate 
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
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counted as strikes for purposes of § 1915(g).  In doing so 
now, we are guided by the driving purpose of the PLRA – 
preserving resources of both the courts and the defendants in 
prisoner litigation.  See Thompson v. Drug Enforcement 
Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  This purpose is 
served by both (1) identifying and reducing frivolous actions 
and appeals by prisoners and (2) reducing litigation on 
whether a particular dismissal constitutes a strike. 
 We agree with the majority of our sister courts of 
appeals that § 1915(g) requires that a prisoner‟s entire action 
or appeal be dismissed on enumerated grounds in order for 
the dismissal to count as a strike.  See, e.g., Tolbert v. 
Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 651 (4th Cir. 2011); Turley v. 
Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2010); Thompson, 
492 F.3d at 432.  Building on this point, amicus asserts that 
we should adopt a rule preventing a reviewing court from 
finding a strike in a prior dismissal if the dismissal does not 
explicitly state that the action or appeal was dismissed 
entirely for grounds covered by § 1915(g). 
Amicus cites a number of cases that provide persuasive 
support for the adoption of such of rule.  See Haury v. 
Lemmon, 656 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction cannot warrant a strike 
unless the assertion of jurisdiction is also found to be 
frivolous); Tolbert, 635 F.3d at 653 (holding that an entire 
action or appeal must be dismissed under § 1915(g)‟s 
enumerated grounds for a strike to accrue, and noting that 
such an approach avoids a “laborious analysis of procedural 
history”); Thompson, 492 F.3d at 438 (adopting a bright-line 
rule with respect to actions dismissed for failure to exhaust 
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administrative remedies that prevents a strike from being 
accrued for failure to state a claim unless the action was 
expressly dismissed for “failure to state a claim” or dismissed 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)); Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 
115, 115 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating, in dicta, that a judgment 
“should clearly state the reasons for the dismissal, including 
whether the dismissal is because the claim is „frivolous,‟ 
„malicious,‟ or „fails to state a claim‟”). 
Also relevant, however, is Hafed v. Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011).  There, a 
district court dismissed a prisoner‟s complaint under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) without clearly indicating whether it was 
relying on § 1915A(b)(1) for frivolousness or § 1915A(b)(2) 
for suing an immune defendant – a ground that does not 
support the accrual of a strike under § 1915(g).  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit approached the issue 
of whether to count the dismissal as a strike by stating: 
“Our determination that a particular dismissal 
constitutes a strike is not formalistic or 
mechanical; rather, we must consider the nature 
of the dismissal and, if the district court did not 
make it clear, whether the dismissal fits within 
the language of § 1915(g).” 
Id.  The Tenth Circuit, in that particular instance, determined 
that even though the district court mentioned the defendant‟s 
immunity and did not explicitly state that the entire action 
was frivolous, “the immunity ground for dismissal was 
subsumed in frivolousness.”  Id.  The Hafed Court thus 
counted the dismissal as a strike for purposes of § 1915(g). 
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The approach taken in Hafed serves the PLRA‟s 
driving purpose in that it reduces the likelihood of future 
frivolous actions by prisoners.  If courts are permitted to 
consider the nature of the dismissal and determine whether 
the dismissal fits within the language of § 1915(g), then there 
is less likelihood that a dismissal intended as a strike will slip 
through the cracks created by a categorical rule that bars 
courts from undertaking such an examination.  However, as 
noted by amicus, the Hafed approach also runs counter to the 
PLRA‟s goals in that it will inevitably lead to more, and 
perhaps unnecessary, litigation on whether or not a particular 
dismissal constitutes a strike. 
Although we recognize the benefit of the Hafed 
approach, we are ultimately persuaded that the PLRA‟s 
purpose is best served by taking an approach that does not 
open the door to more litigation surrounding § 1915(g).  
Thus, we adopt the following rule:  a strike under § 1915(g) 
will accrue only if the entire action or appeal is (1) dismissed 
explicitly because it is “frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fails to 
state a claim” or (2) dismissed pursuant to a statutory 
provision or rule that is limited solely to dismissals for such 
reasons, including (but not necessarily limited to) 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Applying this rule, we must now decide whether the 
dismissal of Byrd‟s appeal in Byrd v. Gillis under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because it was “without merit” constitutes a 
strike.  The dismissal is not encompassed by the first category 
of our adopted rule.  The terms “frivolous,” “malicious,” or 
“fails to state a claim” were not used to dismiss the appeal in 
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its entirety.  Although we have often associated the term 
“without merit” with the term “frivolous,” we cannot say that 
these terms have the exact same meaning.  Regardless, the 
first category of our new rule requires that the terms 
“frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fails to state a claim” be 
explicitly stated for the dismissal to constitute a strike. 
Neither is the dismissal encompassed by the second 
category of our adopted rule.  Section 1915(e)(2)(B) is not 
limited to dismissals that are “frivolous,” “malicious,” or 
“fail[] to state a claim.”  Section 1915(e)(2)(B) states as 
follows: 
“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if 
the court determines that the action or appeal – 
(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a 
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 
is immune from such relief.” 
 If the Court had indicated more precisely that the 
dismissal was based on § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), then the result of 
our analysis would be different.  However, by merely 
dismissing the appeal generally under § 1915(e)(2)(B), we 
cannot determine with certainty that Byrd‟s appeal was 
dismissed for reasons warranting a strike under § 1915(g). 
 In sum, the dismissal of Byrd‟s appeal in Byrd v. Gillis 
does not constitute a strike.  Byrd has only two strikes under 
§ 1915(g) and is eligible to proceed IFP in this appeal.  We 






Byrd asserts that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment to Spencer based on Byrd‟s failure to 
exhaust his administrative remedies by not naming Spencer in 
his November 3, 2008 grievance.  Under the PLRA, “[n]o 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 
under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner confined in jail, prison, 
or other correctional facility until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a).  The PLRA itself does not have a “name all 
defendants” requirement.  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217 
(2007).  However, prisoners are required to complete the 
administrative review process in accordance with rules that 
are defined by the prison grievance process.  Id. at 218.  The 
relevant provision of the prison grievance system at the time 
that Byrd filed his grievance in 2008 was DC-ADM 804, Part 
VI.A.7, which stated, in pertinent part:  “The inmate will 
                                              
4
 We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s 
decision to grant summary judgment.  Williams v. Beard, 482 
F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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identify any person(s) who may have information that could 
be helpful in resolving the grievance.”5 
Byrd did not identify Spencer in his November 3, 2008 
grievance.  Additionally, there is no indication that prison 
administrators were aware that Spencer was allegedly 
involved with the events surrounding the grievance before 
Byrd filed suit.  The District Court thus properly granted 
summary judgment to Spencer. 
ii. 
 Byrd also asserts that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment to Stanishefski and Robinson on 
the basis that the delays in providing eye drops were not the 
result of deliberate indifference to a serious medical 
condition.  The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and 
unusual punishments.”  The amendment proscribes 
punishments that “involve the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain.”  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 
(1976).  Deliberate indifference to a prisoner‟s serious 
medical needs constitutes an unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain.  Id. at 104. 
                                              
5
 The policies of the Pennsylvania Inmate Grievance 
System were amended in 2010.  The provision requiring 
inmates to identify individuals can now be found at DC-ADM 
804, § 1.A.11, which states, in pertinent part:  “The inmate 
shall identify individuals directly involved in the event(s).” 
 23 
 Although Byrd‟s glaucoma may constitute a serious 
medical condition, he has not shown that the delays in 
supplying his eye drops were due to deliberate indifference.  
Byrd‟s longest period without eye drops occurred after his 
prescription expired on July 31, 2008.  He did not notify 
Stanishefski about the matter until September 16, 2008.  After 
Byrd notified Stanishefski, the prescription was renewed on 
September 22, 2008, and Byrd was given eye drops on 
September 23, 2008.  Under Byrd‟s self-medication program, 
he is responsible for the renewal of his prescriptions, and 
thus, he was responsible for this delay.  Other delays were 
caused by the pharmacy that provided the eye drops.  
Therefore, the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment to Stanishefski and Robinson. 
iii. 
 Byrd asserts that the District Court failed, in its 
summary judgment opinion, to address his claims against 
Shannon and Varner – claims that were previously dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(6).
6
  We construe Byrd‟s assertion as one 
faulting the District Court for not reconsidering its earlier 
decision to dismiss Shannon and Varner.  The Magistrate 
Judge‟s report and recommendation, which was adopted by 
the District Court, noted that the local rules for the Middle 
                                              
6
 Byrd does not appeal the District Court‟s order 
granting the motion to dismiss.  Instead, his pro se brief 
indicates only that he is appealing “the order granting the 
defendants [sic] motion for summary judgment.”  Informal 
Brief, at 1. 
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District of Pennsylvania require a motion for reconsideration 
to be filed within 14 days after the entry concerned.  See Byrd 
v. Shannon, No. 09-cv-1551, 2010 WL 5889519 at *7 (M.D. 
Pa. Nov. 24, 2010) (citing M.D. Pa. LR 7.10). 
 Byrd did not request that the District Court reconsider 
its decision to dismiss Shannon and Varner until he filed his 
brief in opposition to the defendants‟ motion for summary 
judgment, more than seven months after the District Court 
issued its order dismissing Shannon and Varner.  The District 





 Because we will affirm the District Court‟s order 
granting summary judgment, along with its decision to 
decline reconsideration of its previous order, we will also 
affirm the District Court‟s decision to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction over Byrd‟s state law negligence claims.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . [if] the district court 
has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 
726 (1966) (holding that when federal claims are dismissed 
before trial, federal courts should not separately entertain 
pendent state claims). 
                                              
7
 Generally, we give deference to a district court‟s 
interpretation of its own local rules.  See Gov’t of the V.I. v. 
Mills, 634 F.3d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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IV. 
 Byrd was eligible to proceed IFP in this appeal.  We 
will affirm the District Court‟s order granting summary 
judgment, its decision to decline reconsideration of its 
previous order, and its decision to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction over Byrd‟s state law claims.8 
                                              
8
 We express gratitude to the director and students of 
the Appellate Litigation Clinic at the Earle Mack School of 
Law at Drexel University for an excellent presentation of the 
issues pertaining to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) as court-appointed 
amicus curiae. 
